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Theorising Bioart Encounters after Gilbert 
Simondon 
 
Abstract  
In recent years “bioart” has been lauded in the social sciences for its creative engagements with 
the ontological stakes of new forms of biotechnical life in-the-making. In this paper I push 
further to explore the ontogenetic potentials of bioart-encounters to generate new capacities for 
thinking and perceiving the nonhuman agencies imbricated in the becoming of subjects. To 
explore this potential I stage an encounter with Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of 
individuation, highlighting three implications for theorisations of the constitution and 
transformation of subjects. First, Simondon forces us to rethink the subject in terms of its 
transductive emergence from preindividual processes, and its metastable susceptibility to 
ongoing transformations. Second, he substitutes voluntarist conceptions of thought with an 
involuntarist primacy of material encounters as the conditions for novel individuations. Finally, 
I argue that Simondon enables a thinking of the politics of the (bio)art-encounter in terms of 
its ontogenetic capacity to materially produce, rather than merely represent, new subjects and 
worlds.  
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Introduction  
In recent years the field of “bioarts” practice has been lauded in the social science literature for 
its creative engagements with the ontological stakes of new forms of biotechnical life in-the-
making (Zylinska, 2009; Thacker, 2007). Characterised by creative practices in which vital 
materials and biotechnologies become an integral part of the artistic process as well as the 
artwork itself, bioart1 has typically been understood in this critical literature in terms of its 
capacity to alter extant ways of thinking about the nature of the arts and life sciences, as well 
as to transform the relations between artists and scientists and their objects and publics (Born 
and Barry, 2010: 105). In this paper I push the framing of this “logic of ontology” in bioarts 
practice further to theorise the potentials of bioart encounters to materially reconfigure the 
subject, reconnecting it with nonhuman forces and technical agencies that not only call into 
question the kinds of beings we think we are (our ontological constitution), but also condition 
the material possibilities for what we might yet become (what I term, following the philosopher 
Gilbert Simondon (2009a), our ontogenetic capacities). I focus here specifically on the artistic 
practices of one of the most prominent collectives, The Tissue Culture and Art Project 
(TC&A), whose work productively foregrounds the ontogenetic stakes of bioart encounters in 
two main ways. First, and conceptually, their practice highlights the insufficiencies of an 
ontological privileging of “the individual” in much social science and philosophical thinking 
for engaging the new technological renderings of “life” within the contemporary life sciences, 
where life becomes defined less as a property of discrete organic bodies that we can observe, 
and more in terms of a heterogeneous and overlapping milieu of material elements, 
technologies, and environments we might manipulate and engineer (Boucher, 2012). The 
ontological implications of this “dephasing” of life has thus been an ongoing focus of TC&A’s 
creative inquiry into the increasing potentials of the life sciences to create new forms of 
biotechnical individual, which they term the ‘semi-living’, comprising living fragments grown 
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over synthetic scaffolds that require technological intervention for their growth and 
maintenance (Catts and Zurr, 2013: 104). Second, and politically, the lead artists Ionat Zurr 
and Oron Catts state that by growing evocative ‘semi-living sculptures’ their practice attempts 
to reimagine the ontological status of these entities beyond theories of human exceptionalism 
omnipresent in cultural and technoscientific narratives on life, as well as an ‘increasingly 
pervasive engineering mentality’ that reduces life to a raw material organised around 
anthropocentric logics of utility and control (Zurr, 2012: 288)2. By staging vital encounters 
with their fleshy materiality in the gallery space, TC&A’s installations instead creatively 
experiment with the possibilities for alternate relations of thought, vital matters and 
biotechnologies, generating new capacities for thinking and perceiving the different gradients 
of life that surround and constitute us (Dixon et al, 2012).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 – The evocative materiality of the Semi-Living Worry Dolls from the Tissue 
Culture and Art(ificial) Wombs Installation, Ars Electronica 2000. Medium: McCoy Cell line, 
biodegradable/bioabsorbable polymers, and surgical sutures. © Tissue Culture and Art Project 
(2000&2011). Photo: Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr] 
 
The shock of the bioart encounter for contemporary social theory is clear: our capacities to 
think the reactive pressures and creative potentials of contemporary forms of biotechnical 
emergence, as well as our politics for articulating and performing these differently, depends on 
the elaboration of a new mode and image of thought. A thought that commences not from a 
presumption of the initial ‘givenness’ of individuated being, but rather from an affirmation of 
the ongoing event of its individuation within material processes that precede and go beyond it 
(Combes, 2012: 1). In other words, and drawing here on the philosophy of Simondon (2009a: 
6), ‘a thought that would prove adequate to the problem of ontogenesis’. In this paper then I 
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explore the implications of Simondon’s philosophy for how we might theorise bioart 
encounters as ontogenetic events that materially produce, rather than merely represent, new 
subjects and worlds. Whilst some scholars identify a tendency in Simondon’s (1980: 49-50) 
work to clearly distinguish the technical and the living that would appear to jar with a 
contemporary thinking on biotechnology (Harvey et al, 2008), I argue that his transductive 
understanding of individuation, which focuses on the intensive foldings of living and nonliving 
forces as collectives become, affords new ways of articulating the political stakes of such 
artistic interventions in biotechnical processes, which serve to generate sites of encounter 
through which thought is opened to the creative potentials of life in excess of the individuated 
forms and bodies that would seek to capture it (Hynes, 2007).  
 
To theorise this ontogenetic potential of bioart encounters the paper draws out three key 
implications of Simondon’s philosophy for contemporary theorisations of the material 
constitution and creative transformations of subjects. Firstly, Simondon challenges inherited 
protocols of thinking ‘the subject’ as a transcendental necessity or norm, forcing us to rethink 
subjects through immanent logics of emergence and metastability (Read, 2011). His 
ontological inversion of individuals to material processes of individuation thus foregrounds the 
inadequacies of representational and individualist modes of thought for grasping the active 
participation of nonhuman agencies, technical environments, and affective forces in 
productions of human thought and action (Dewsbury, 2012; Parisi, 2009; Sharp, 2011). This 
more processual ontology of the subject also opens new ways of thinking ‘processes of 
subjectivation’ as a key terrain of political intervention and transformation (Guattari, 1995: 
25), with recent work addressing the proliferation of spaces and technologies of biopolitical 
control that modulate the emergences of material dispositions, capacities and habits (Ash, 
2012; Roberts, 2012; Sharpe, 2013). Secondly then, I argue that a philosophy of ontogenesis 
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enjoins us to rethink events of subjective transformation, replacing a ‘voluntarist’ image of the 
subject prevalent in much social scientific thinking with an ‘involuntarist’ primacy of the 
encounter (Zourabichvili, 2012: 56; Sauvagnargues, 2012). Framed through ontogenetic logics 
of the encounter, the world thus reclaims an inventive potential beyond the strict confines of 
the volitional subject, with the affective force of nonhuman materialities providing the creative 
spur to novel individuations and becomings. Finally, and following Simondon’s (2011a, 2012) 
writing on the ontogenetic potentials of aesthetics to produce new immanent relations of 
thought and world, I argue that art provides a privileged event-space for such transformative 
encounters (Michaud, 2012). For Simondon (2011a: 412), what defines art is its powers of what 
he terms ‘reticulation’: its capacity to forge new and unexpected connections of modes of 
thought, vital bodies, technical objects, and energetic milieus. By foregrounding these 
relational potentials, Simondon’s conception of art proves especially prescient for theorising 
the experience and politics of contemporary forms of arts practice, such as bioart, that emerge 
through the convergence of material, vital, and technical processes of individuation (Brunner 
and Fritsch, 2011). Thinking such art-technology encounters as ontogenetic and relational 
events, I contend, also generates an alternate sense of their political potential, pushing social 
theory beyond its preoccupation with art’s representational capacity to individualise (that is, to 
confirm or subvert extant identities or subjects in the world), and towards its non-
representational capacity to individuate (to produce new material sensibilities; to invent new 
potential forms of life) (Hynes, 2013; Lapworth, 2015). 
 
This paper therefore aims to stage a mutually transformative encounter between the ontogenetic 
thinking of Simondon and the bioart practices of TC&A. Theorising bioart through Simondon, 
I argue, opens a thinking of bioart that goes beyond traditional discussions of its subjective 
effects on the viewer, as well as simplistic diagnoses of a “posthuman” rupture. As Robert 
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Mitchell (2010, 2012) has previously argued, Simondon’s conception of artworks as sites of 
intense mediation between thought, technologies, and bodies provides a compelling 
understanding of the experience of bioart in the gallery, which focuses affective attention on 
those “sites” (e.g. orifices such as the nose and mouth) and “processes” (eating, breathing, 
touching) of the body through which nonhuman milieus are literally inserted into the human. 
However, and pushing further than Mitchell, I explore how Simondon’s theorisation of the 
‘transductive’ forces of art-encounters offers a more ontogenetic sense of the potentials of 
bioart, understood not just as transforming relations between extant subjects and objects, but 
as immanent interventions in collective processes of individuation through which these 
embodied subjects and semi-living objects come into being. I therefore begin in the following 
section by drawing out key concepts from Simondon’s theory of individuation – specifically 
singularity, metastability, transduction, and affectivity – that foreground a different 
understanding of the material processes weaving the immanent fabric of the social, opening 
contemporary thinking on the subject to the preindividual forces and nonhuman relations 
imbricated in its ongoing formation, as well as conditioning its metastable susceptibility to 
disruption and transformation through novel encounters.  
 
Conversely then, I argue that theorising Simondon through bioart serves to actualise new 
potentials of his thinking, providing a site to reassess certain interpretations that reduce the full 
complexity of his thought on the material relations and co-evolutions of being and technology. 
I am thinking here, for example, of the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler (2009) who reduces 
Simondon’s ontology of preindividual being to a subset of his conception of the technique 
(Barthélémy, 2012). On the other hand, the recent work of Elizabeth Grosz (2011, 2012) draws 
from Simondon a contemporary politics of individuation and (inorganic) life entirely 
disconnected from his thinking on technical objects. With an ever increasing interest in 
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Simondon’s thought in contemporary social theory, important questions thus emerge regarding 
the potential ways in which we might ‘inherit’ Simondon today (Stengers, 2004; Hayward and 
Geoghegan, 2012). Following Adrian Mackenzie (2002), I argue for an approach that would 
follow the spirit of Simondon’s ‘transductive’ method: one that returns his concepts to use, 
discovering new operations, and forging new connections between heterogeneous domains of 
thought and practice that expand the possibilities of this inheritance. It is this approach I seek 
to enact in this paper, highlighting how an encounter with bioart can help facilitate the task of 
thinking transductively across what have typically been read as independent and self-contained 
‘pillars’ of this thought (Chabot, 2013: 107)3: between his philosophical reflections on being 
and individuation (Simondon, 1992, 2009a), the genesis and evolution of technical objects 
(1980, 2009b), as well as his lesser-known writings on the potentials of ‘technoaesthetic’ 
encounters (Simondon, 2012, Simondon, 2011a).   
  
From Individuals to Individuations: the Philosophy of Simondon 
Following a gradual trickle of translated extracts from his works into English over the last few 
years, as well as the recent translation of two influential commentaries (Combes, 2012; Chabot, 
2013), an increasing number of contemporary scholars have been drawn to the thought of 
Simondon and especially its implications for current debates around technical activity (Ash, 
2014; LaMarre, 2012; Kinsley, 2014), nonhuman agency (Venn, 2010; Grosz, 2012), and a 
politics of individuation (Toscano, 2012; Read, 2011). What is distinctive about these 
contemporary engagements is a growing appreciation of Simondon as a philosopher, whose 
work presents a radical transformation in the terms and modes through which philosophy thinks 
being. This challenges a long-standing tendency, stemming in part from the critical acclaim 
given to his first publication, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques [1958] (henceforth 
MEOT), to read Simondon (1980) as merely a ‘thinker of technics’ (Combes, 2012: 57)4. This 
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new wave of engagement with Simondon’s philosophy in recent social theory, I argue, can be 
broadly divided into two distinct perspectives. The first situates Simondon in a philosophical 
lineage of phenomenological thinking (especially in relation to his doctoral supervisor, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty), framing his theorisation of the potentials of technical individuation 
through the subjectivist lens of the ‘lived body’ and intersubjective relationality (Hansen, 2006; 
Landes, 2014; de Beistegui, 2005). The second perspective, and what I draw on in this paper 
to rethink bioart, is a non-phenomenological, Deleuzian reading that more forcefully shifts 
social theory from the prevalence of a ‘human constructivism’ to what Brian Massumi (2009: 
38) terms a ‘nonhuman inventivism’, highlighting the preindividual forces and material 
processes conditioning the emergence of bodies and subjects (Grosz, 2012; Iliadis, 2013).  
  
Indeed, it was Deleuze (2001: 43) who, in a review of Simondon’s L’Individu et sa genèse 
physico-biologique [1964], provides one of the earliest engagements with Simondon’s thought 
as philosophy, finding a ‘profoundly original theory of individuation’ that he would draw on 
in the elaboration of his own concepts of ‘impersonal singularity’, ‘intensive difference’, and 
‘transcendental field’ (Deleuze, 2004a, 2004b). There is now a growing body of scholarship 
exploring the resonances and overlaps between their ontogenetic philosophies, which has 
tended to focus on the significance of Simondon for generating new perspectives on Deleuze’s 
thinking (Bowden, 2012; Rozzoni, 2012; Sauvagnargues, 2012). However, and conversely, 
there has been much less critical reflection on the implications of Deleuze’s reading for 
contemporary interpretations of Simondon, and the commentators that do address this question 
have typically argued for an approach to Simondon “purified” of his association with Deleuzian 
philosophy (Hansen, 2001; Barthélémy, 2012). Whilst there is certainly a danger of too easily 
conflating their philosophies within the contemporary literature5, I want to stake a stronger 
claim in this paper for the productivity of Deleuze’s encounter with Simondon, especially in 
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the context of rethinking bioart, which by foregrounding the centrality of ‘preindividual 
disparity’ and ‘the problematic’ to Simondon’s genetic ontology pushes us beyond humanist 
and phenomenological interpretations of a theory and politics of individuation to explicitly 
foreground the immanent folds of material processes and ‘inhuman’ encounters in the 
vicissitudes of subjects (Toscano, 2012: 111). Thinking Simondon through Deleuze’s 
innovative reading in this section enables me to delineate two main postulates of a philosophy 
of individuation that provide the basis for an ontogenetic conception of bioart encounters: the 
rethinking of individuals as emergent and metastable syntheses of preindividual singularities; 
and an understanding of events of subjective transformation in terms of the irruption through 
encounter of forces of disparation prior to subjects that introduce discord into habitual circuits 
of sense-making, opening other possibilities for thinking, feeling, and being.   
 
Thinking the Preindividual: Singularity, Encounter, Metastability 
For Deleuze, the force of Simondon’s thought lies in the problem that it rediscovers and 
reinvents. The specific problem motivating Simondon’s novel theoretical constructions is the 
problem of individuation, or the question of the processes conditioning the emergence and 
differentiation of individuals in any domain. Whilst individuation is by no means a novel 
concern for philosophy, Simondon (2009a: 4) contends that throughout its history Western 
metaphysics has been captive to a static conception of being, one which takes ‘the reality of 
the constituted individual’ as its central and organising principle. More specifically, he argues 
that philosophy has tended to understand the reality of individuation through two main 
approaches, both with their roots in ancient Greek philosophy: a substantialist tradition of 
uncreated unitary being following Epicurus, and the hylomorphic schema developed by 
Aristotle (Simondon, 2009a: 5). What unites these approaches is their stubborn attempt to 
disclose a ‘principle of individuation’ which they can only think in the form of a ‘term that is 
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already given’ (Combes, 2012: 2). Accounting for the moulding of a clay brick, for example, 
Simondon argues that a hylomorphic approach understands its individuation in terms of the 
imposition of an anterior and active principle of form (the shape of the physical mould) on an 
amorphous and passive matter (the clay) (Sauvagnargues, 2012: 3). Indeed, one of the aims of 
Simondon’s philosophy is to demonstrate how the form-matter distinction of hylomorphism is 
not only a problem for our thinking of the genesis of physical objects, but also underwrites 
dominant conceptions of technology (culture as forming, or formed by, an external technology) 
as well as aesthetics (the Kantian duality of material content and transcendental form) 
(Mackenzie, 2002: 45). For Simondon (2009a: 6), this ontological privileging of the constituted 
term, and transcendent separation of the principle of individuation from its process, is a 
pernicious habit of thought that renders philosophy incapable of both thinking the operations 
and mediating relations that constitute the individual, as well as for imagining other immanent 
modes of existence beyond the already-given. For a static dialectic of form-matter coupling 
then, Simondon substitutes an energetics of modulation, shifting a thought of individuation 
from the reality of individuated forms to a process of continuous and unpredictable becoming 
on a shifting plane of preindividual forces and tendencies6. To conceive individuation as 
dynamic and relational events of modulation, Simondon (2009a: 5) famously argues for a 
thought that would seek to grasp ‘the ontogenesis in the entire progression of its reality, and to 
know the individual through the individuation, rather than the individuation through the 
individual’. 
 
So how does Simondon begin to articulate the individual in terms of its ontogenesis? For 
Deleuze (2001), the originality of Simondon’s response to this question is the way his 
philosophy forces us to think the emergence of the new from the standpoint of ‘preindividual 
singularities’ rather than the constituted individual. Simondon, he argues, urges us to imagine: 
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‘A world of discrete singularities that overlap, that overlap all the more in that they do 
not yet communicate, in that they are not yet held within an individuality: such is the 
first moment of being’ (Deleuze, 2001: 45-46) 
 
As Deleuze (2004b) highlights, singularities here are thus not the pre-given qualities or 
predicates of an individual as in substantialist modes of thought, but are rather immanent events 
in its creative emergence, constituting ‘points of inflection’ around which a situation transforms 
itself and follows a new trajectory of becoming (Debaise, 2012: 5). In his own writings, 
Simondon (2009a: 9) offers a more physicalist definition of the singularity through the 
paradigmatic example of ‘crystallisation’, theorising its irruptive emergence as the energetic 
catalyst, or ‘seed’, that forces a field of potentials into a state of ‘problematic disparity or 
tension’. Individuation proceeds from this dynamic and heterogeneous condition of disparation 
by inventing a new dimension - ‘the individual’ - that facilitates novel modes of interactive 
communication between divergent orders and singularities. Following Simondon then, the 
concept of the individual is radically transformed: no longer primary in the order of sense, it is 
instead rethought as an emergent and ‘partial resolution’ to an encounter between disparate 
forces and potentials that comprise the energetic milieu of the preindividual (Simondon, 2009a: 
8). To conceive of these new mediations and integrations of forces through the encounter, 
Simondon argues that we must replace the abstract and static notion of ‘form’ in hylomorphic 
thinking with the intensive and material force of what he terms information. Rather than an 
external term to the matter it transforms like in cybernetic theories, information is instead 
understood as an immanent force of tension that generates a ‘demand for individuation’ as an 
iterative and ongoing process of ‘taking-form’ (Simondon, 1992: 315-316).  
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Framed through this ontology of preindividual singularities and problematic encounters, 
Simondon thus argues that ‘the individual’ must not be understood as a static, complete, and 
stable form.  Nor, however, should it be defined in terms of a chaotic openness or instability, 
and indeed Simondon is particularly interested in thinking the various material thresholds, 
mentalities, and embodied orientations that constitute an individual’s specific form of 
openness. Inspired by the theorisations of energetic states from the thermodynamics of his time, 
Simondon contends that to theorise individuation’s dynamic process requires recourse to a 
conception of being as metastable; that is, an equilibrium ‘supersaturated’ with incompatible 
singularities and divergent force-relations that provide the conditions for new individuations 
(Simondon, 1992: 301). As metastable, the emergent individual does not exhaust this potential 
in the single stroke of its individuation, but is instead ‘always more-than-one’, remaining 
connected to an unresolved charge of preindividual reality that grounds and exceeds the actual 
capacities and relations it has established (Combes, 2012: 3). This preindividual reserve, or 
‘margin of indetermination’ (Simondon, 1980: 4), thus comprises tensions and forces that not 
only condition the potential orientations of the individual, but also render it prone to plural 
individuations and becomings through future encounters (Venn, 2010: 150). As Simondon 
writes: 
  
‘Becoming exists as one of the dimensions of being, corresponding to a capacity beings 
possess of falling out of step themselves, of resolving themselves by the very act of 
falling out of step’ (Simondon, 1992: 300-301) 
 
In sum, Simondon’s philosophy introduces a number of important concepts that begin to open 
a thinking of the transformative potentials of art-encounters beyond the analytical strictures of 
representation and hylomorphism. First, Simondon’s concepts of disparation and information 
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provide a thinking of events of individuation through ontogenetic logics of the encounter, 
which he contends do not occur between already-constituted individualities, but instead play 
out on a preindividual field of forces and singularities that constitute the intensive and 
indeterminate dimensions of inorganic matters, vital bodies, technical objects, and even 
thought. Furthermore, and as I elaborate in the following section, Simondon invites an 
understanding of subjective modes of thought and perception not as stable or self-contained 
forms, but rather as metastable processes of individuation open to future transformations, thus 
foregrounding the subject’s always-incipient potential ‘to be nudged into a different course of 
thought and action’ (Dewsbury, 2012: 74). 
 
Regimes of Individuation and Transductive Affects 
Whilst Simondon does not abandon a concept of ‘the subject’, his philosophy of individuation 
can be understood as an attempt to radically rethink the humanist and essentialist metaphysics 
upon which it has traditionally been built. Central to this is his conception of the distinction 
between living/nonliving and human/nonhuman based not on any substantial difference, but 
rather through an ontogenetic lexicon of interconnected ‘regimes of individuation’ of which he 
distinguishes three: physical, vital, and psycho-social (Simondon, 1992: 312). The initial 
distinction he draws between physical and vital individuations is thus not essential but 
operational, characterised by the type and quantity of relations and processes it implicates in 
response to the demands of information. Whereas a physical individuation is capable of 
receiving information only once, developing and amplifying this initial singularity at its 
topological edges, vital individuations constitute an interior milieu and membrane function 
through which it is capable of receiving successive contributions of information in a perpetual 
activity of becoming (Simondon, 1992: 307). The vital individual thus never attains the static 
self-identity of the physical individual, but is instead defined by Simondon as a ‘theatre of 
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individuation’ which can only maintain its existence by continually resolving problems with 
its surrounding intensive milieu through, for example, movement, excretion, and nutrition 
(Simondon, 1992: 305). Rather than a pre-constituted reality then, the ‘psychic individuation’ 
generative of subjectivity is rethought in terms of a further creative elaboration of problems of 
‘heterogeneity and incompatibility between the vital individual and its preindividual milieu’ 
that the living being resolves through the invention of new metastable orders of interiority and 
‘psychic’ operations (thought, perception, symbolisation) (Simondon, 2005: 108; quoted in 
Hansen, 2006: 171). Furthermore, Simondon argues that these subjective forms are not 
ontologically distinct emergences coming after the physical and vital in chronological 
succession, but are instead co-emergent with them through processes of individuation that bring 
heterogeneous realities into contact, elaborating and complexifying them into something 
different.  
 
To theorise the way in which matter, life and thought individuate conjunctively to generate 
transformative events, Simondon introduces the concept of transduction which denotes: 
 
‘[A] process, be it physical, vital, mental or social in which an activity gradually sets 
itself in motion, propagating within a given area, through a structuration of the different 
zones of the area. Each region of constituted structures serves as principle of 
constitution for the next region, such that a modification is thereby gradually extended 
at the same time as the structuring operation’ (1992: 313) 
 
Emerging as an encounter between disparate realities then, transduction proceeds through the 
energetic restructuring of preindividual forces and singularities in a specific field into new 
metastable orders, which may in turn propagate as information for individuations in other 
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domains. As Adrian Mackenzie (2002: 25-26) has underlined, technological objects and 
processes can be understood as privileged sites of transduction, which operate by reconfiguring 
heterogeneous physical, vital and social milieus, themselves composed of different 
informational structures and potentials, into relations of ‘recurrent causality’ that are generative 
of new ontological realities (Simondon, 1980: 66). As a contemporary example one only has 
to think of the recent proliferation of touchscreen technologies, and how these are working to 
subtly rewire the intensive connections of digital processes of image and sound with the 
sensori-motor capacities of the body in ways that elicit new affective experiences. By 
substituting static theories of substance for relational ontologies of co-emergence, Simondon’s 
concept of transduction thus opens potentials for thinking the transformative stakes of 
contemporary sites of individuation such as bioart that emerge and evolve through the creative 
foldings of vital, technical and subjective realities, and which often entail new and unexpected 
capacities, relations, and practices that challenge extant categories of thought. 
 
For Simondon (2009a: 9), the force that drives and sustains these transductive movements of 
individuation is affectivity. Drawing primarily on Simondon’s (2005: 247) account of psycho-
social individuation in L’Individuation psychique et collective, Couze Venn (2010: 148) argues 
that affectivity is the ‘psyche’s transductive form par excellence’, arising in the mode of an 
encounter between the subject and its charge of preindividual reality exceeding the order of the 
self. By theorising affectivity as a relational force of ontogenesis, Venn highlights how 
Simondon’s philosophy can contribute in a number of interesting ways to contemporary 
debates around the affective rendering of emergent subjectivities. Firstly, and in a similar vein 
to Spinozo-Deleuzian interpretations, affects in Simondon’s thought cannot be reduced to a 
psychic property or interior state of an individuated subject, like personal emotions which 
represent bio-culturally modulated expressions of its felt intensity. Instead, affectivity operates 
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on an impersonal register of relationality, transforming and energising bodies and thought in 
ways that exceed pre-existing significations and articulations. Framed through the lens of 
relationally transformative affects, Simondon (2009a: 10) argues that being therefore never 
possesses a ‘unity of identity’ but only a ‘transductive unity’, implying an understanding of the 
subject wherein material relations to the outside, to the collective, is not something that comes 
to an already constituted subject from without, but something without which the subject would 
not be constituted. Experiences of affectivity then, as Venn (2010: 149) highlights, have an 
important role in Simondon’s thinking as the ‘intensive sign’ or ‘index’ of the subject’s more-
than-individuality; as events of material resonance, registered at the level of pre-conscious 
sensations and vibrations, affects provoke embodied apprehensions of the collective forces and 
nonhuman agencies conditioning the subject’s material transformations and becomings. 
Entailing a momentary loosening of the binds of constituted individuality then, affective 
encounters give rise to events of what Simondon (1992) terms disindividuation which rather 
than dissociating the subject from its capacity to individuate (as in Stiegler’s (2010: 37) limited 
use of the term to diagnose modern technology’s ‘short-circuiting’ of processes of collective 
individuation), instead provide confrontations with the nonindividuated potentials it carries 
within it, which may become actualised in subsequent individuations. Therefore, and although 
Simondon (1992: 317) claims that we cannot ‘know individuation in the common sense of the 
term’ (i.e. as an object of knowledge for a detached, knowing subject), the problematic of 
affectivity constitutes in his thought the possibility for feeling individuation’s transductive 
process (Venn, 2010: 149).  Missing from Venn’s engagement with Simondon’s philosophy, 
however, is a clearer sense of what role technology and art might play in the production of new 
affective relations of the living and nonliving. In the following section, and through an 
engagement with Simondon’s (2012, 2011a) writings on technoaesthetics, I argue that by 
making physical, vital, and psychic registers of experience conjunct in creative ways, 
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contemporary art-technology encounters can be understood to generate new affective 
attunements to the transductive forces modulating between experiencing bodies and expressive 
technologies.  
 
Technoaesthetic Encounters 
Whilst the political implications of his theory of individuation was not of paramount concern 
for Simondon, I argue his philosophy nevertheless provides important resources for 
contemporary critiques of a politics of identity, and particularly the voluntarist conception of 
the subject as the grounds for, and source of, real existential change on which it depends. 
Through the concepts of preindividual singularities and transductive affects outlined above, 
Simondon (2005: 302) stimulates us to readdress the question of the ontogenesis of the social, 
locating the catalyst of change in the movements of disindividuation generated by the event of 
an encounter. Deleuze’s interpretation of Simondon provides an important clarification here, 
arguing that what thought encounters are not already-constituted identities, but rather the 
affective force of non-representational signs: intensive ‘flashes’ of differential forces and 
singularities that cannot be situated within the topos of recognition, confronting thought with 
what it has yet to think (Deleuze, 2004a, 22; Deleuze, 2008). Simondon’s thought thus opens 
towards an alternate conception of the politics of subjective and social change, one which 
following Deleuze’s ‘involuntarist’ reading can be understood less as the actualisation of a 
latent preindividual potential held ‘in common’ by human subjects as in naturalist 
interpretations of a Simondonian politics (e.g. Combes, 2012; Virno, 2004),  and more in terms 
of transformative event-inventions brought about by the ‘inhuman’ shock of material 
encounters (Toscano, 2012: 111). What Simondon offers then, I argue, is a way of thinking an 
ontogenetic politics of encounter founded on two interrelated vectors. The first we might term 
a vector of disindividuation, understood as the irruptive emergence within experience of 
18 
 
intensive signs, new relations of preindividual forces and singularities, which render previously 
sanctioned perceptions and sensations of our milieu inoperable or untenable. The novel 
tensions generated by this rupturing event of disindividuation call for a resolution, thus opening 
possibilities of a second vector of invention, involving a widening of potential in the realm of 
experience and transforming the scope of what a body can do and the affective relations it may 
enter into (Massumi, 2009).  
 
In the final section of MEOT, Simondon (2011a) argues that technology and art represent 
privileged sites of invention, each constituting singular modes of intensive mediation through 
which the subject encounters and connects to preindividual nature. Like his theory of the 
individual Simondon (2011a: 411) provides a genetic account of technology and art, tracing 
their emergence from within what he terms the ‘dephasing of primitive magical unity’, which 
defined an immanent mode of thinking and experiencing the world prior to the ontological 
separation of objects from subjects (science/technics), figure from background (aesthetics), or 
the whole from its parts (religion) (Chabot, 2013: 132). Following Simondon (2011a: 416-417), 
technology and art emerge as different tendencies in (re-)articulating the relations of thought 
and world; where technology extracts and objectifies physical manipulations and gestures that 
render specific localities of an eventfully creative world actionable, art produces intensified 
moments and encounters – or ‘key points’ - that reconnects what is singular in these objects to 
a wider universe of forces and affects. With technology, however, he contends that our capacity 
to think and engage these ontogenetic possibilities is attenuated due to the predominance of 
hylomorphism in cultural and philosophical responses to technological objects, which consider 
them from the impoverished angle of a fabricational intentionality overseeing their creation 
(Simondon, 1980: 2). Simondon’s (1980: 64) point is that ‘technical invention’ does not 
proceed through the hylomorphic imposition of cognitive forms or schematics on matter from 
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the outside, but rather as an indeterminate event that always has the potential to exceed the 
intentions of design, coming about through processes of ‘self-conditioning emergence’ that 
shift present forces into new compatible orders of material relation. Providing the example of 
the Guimbal hydro-powered turbine in MEOT, Simondon (1980: 57-59) contends that while 
the engineer may indeed act to bring the energetic fields of tidal seawater and pressurised oil 
to the brink of a new regime of functioning, the crossing of the threshold to technical operation 
belongs to the novel actualisations of their own plurifunctional potentials. However, what 
defines the singularity of ’technical invention’ in contrast to the more irruptive creativity of 
vital or aesthetic modalities is that it is a process driven by a broader tendency which he terms 
concretisation. Understood as a process of concretisation, technical evolution thus unfolds 
through the increasing convergence and integration of heterogeneous elements and forces into 
self-sufficient modes of interoperability (Simondon, 1980: 31).  
  
Simondon (2012) further develops these reflections on the potential relations of art and 
technology in his later writing on ‘technoaesthetics’. Rather than ontologically discrete 
domains, Simondon (2012: 3) instead provides a transductive understanding of ‘the technical’ 
and ‘the aesthetic’ as two dynamic poles in a shifting continuum of process. Indeed the 
difference between them, as Massumi (2011: 53) argues in his engagement with Simondon’s 
philosophy of aesthetics, is that the regulatory principles of technical concretisations tend 
towards the poles of functionality and profitability – or ‘use-value’. Art, on the other hand, has 
no manifest use-value and sometimes even no exchange-value. ‘At its best’, Massumi writes, 
art possesses ‘event-value’. Simondon therefore argues that whereas technology tends towards 
the creation of divergent fields of objects separated through the specialisation and 
individualisation of function, art is an attempt to establish anew the transductive connections 
between heterogeneous modalities of thought, perception and practice with respect to each 
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other: for ‘re-reticulating’ the world differently (Simondon, 2011a: 417). This transductive 
event-value, as Massumi highlights, provokes a more inventive sense of art’s political potential 
– ‘it is that which pushes further towards the indeterminate but relationally potentialised fringes 
of existing situations, beyond the limits of current framings or regulatory principles’ (Massumi, 
2011: 53). 
 
Whilst Simondon’s own writings on aesthetics tended to focus on more traditional examples 
of artistic object like paintings or sculptures (Mitchell, 2012: 101), I argue that his conception 
of art as a transductive event opens towards new ways of thinking the transformative potentials 
of contemporary art-technology encounters, retaining a sensitivity to the affective and 
relational processes through which technology becomes artful. This evental potential, as 
Massumi (2011) makes clear, is not something that art brings ex nihilo to the otherwise 
deadening reproductions of technologies (as in Grosz’s (2004: 260) rather dualistic account of 
art and technology), but instead emerges through art’s creative encounter with the transductive 
forces and indeterminate potentials within technology to generate other possibilities of thinking 
and feeling. Art does this by producing a disindividuating rupture in sense, suspending bodies 
and technologies from their semiotic contents and the dominant significations circulating in the 
social field (Massumi, 2011). Within Simondon’s writings then, art is understood not to address 
itself to the already-individuated forms and functions of the present, but instead generates 
interstices in the present that deploy the inventive forces and potentials of futures yet-to-come 
(Hynes, 2013: 1940). As he writes in Imagination et Invention: 
 
‘every inventor in the matter of art is a futurist to a certain extent, which means that he 
exceeds hic et nunc of needs and ends by enlisting in the created object sources of effects 
that live and multiply themselves in the work: the creator is sensitive to the virtual […] 
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the progress of the future and the amplitude of the world as a place of manifestation’ 
(Simondon, 2008: 182; Translated in Michaud, 2012: 128). 
 
It is this ‘future-orientation’ (O’Sullivan, 2010: 189) of the art-encounter that defines its 
ontogenetic potential: its suspension of the most available potentials, those potentials already 
most comfortingly embodied and usefully habitualised, instead opening the subject to 
unforeseen and unthinkable forces of becoming. 
 
This more ontogenetic understanding of art-technology encounters thus gestures towards a 
sense of politics obscured by a representational analytic, which is less the didactic critique of 
extant positions and discourses, than a creative experimentation with new potentials of thinking 
and feeling beyond the limits of current framings.  Simondon’s philosophy provides the tools 
to affirm this potential, enabling us to think art-encounters as disindividuating events that by 
suspending functional modalities of relation to other individuals, and by enabling these 
individuals to appear in their more-than-individuality, ‘force the subject to become aware of 
what in itself is more-than-itself, and to become engaged in new individuations called forth by 
this discovery’ (Combes, 2012: 38). It is this potential of bioart encounters to generate new 
capacities for thinking and perceiving the human subject, and to transform relational 
configurations of embodied subjects, semi-living entities, and technologies that I want to 
unpack in the final sections of this paper.  
 
Affective Disindividuations: Transducing the ‘Extended Body’ 
To date, a number of academic commentators and art critics have interpreted the experience 
and politics of TC&A’s bioart through a narrowly representational lens of rational and 
intentional subjects, suggesting that insofar as the affective encounter disturbs and fascinates, 
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it disables capacities of critical judgement on the tendencies of contemporary biotechnologies 
(Gigliotti, 2006; Birke, 2006). This theoretical pitching of an artistic politics at the 
representational level of subjective judgement and institutional critique has meant it has been 
those bioarts practices that articulate an explicit manifesto for social change (such as the activist 
practices of the Critical Art Ensemble) which have typically been celebrated over and above 
the more playful, ironic, and affective interventions of TC&A (Giannachi, 2006). Here then, I 
argue Simondon’s philosophy provides a more productive lens for theorising the affective and 
ontogenetic registers of politics opened up by bioart encounters for two main reasons. Firstly, 
Simondon’s (2009b: 24) theory of ‘technical mentality’ pushes us beyond the ideological and 
discursive interpretations of dominant forms of thinking and doing technology we find in 
critical theory, to instead attend to the metastable field of material perceptions, affective 
dispositions, and immanent values that are the ontogenetic conditions for these emergent 
modalities of thought and action. For Simondon (2012), and as foregrounded in his concept of 
‘technoaesthetics’, a concern with technology is thus also a concern with aesthetic thought and 
practice – of the capacities of technical objects to transform material capacities of thinking, 
perceiving and sensing the world. Simondon (2009b: 24) therefore affirms artistic practices 
and encounters as a privileged field for transforming our ‘technical mentalities’ (beyond 
representational logics of function and use) in ways that might attune thought to the creative 
and indeterminate potentials of technical and vital processes. Secondly, and as Mitchell (2012: 
98) highlights, Simondon’s material reimagining of artworks as intense sites of ‘mediation’ 
helps us to think the embodied sense of ‘becoming-medium’ for other forms of life at stake in 
bioart encounters, which he argues generate possibilities for altering the topological relations 
connecting ‘gallerygoers’ as elements within broader milieus of biotechnology that 
incorporate, for example, technical functions, scientific practices, and rituals of consumption. 
However, and by framing this transformative potential in terms of the production of new 
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‘interpersonal relations’ and connections of ‘spectators to the wider world’, I argue there is a 
tendency in Mitchell’s (2012: 101) account to fall back into a separation of constituted subjects 
and the world “outside”, and thus a rather conventional understanding of mediation as an 
external relation between constituted terms. Through an engagement with Simondon’s (2009a) 
concepts of ‘transduction’ and the ‘transindividual’ in this section, I instead want to delineate 
the more specific, ontogenetic sense of artistic mediation operative in Simondon’s thought, 
understood as an event of individuation involving the reciprocal transformation and becoming 
of subjects and world.  
 
As noted earlier, affective encounters are central to Simondon’s conception of the 
“disindividuation” of the subject, carving a space through which preindividual reality bursts 
forth to potentialise the present, and exposing us to a moment in which the fiction of a static 
and isolated self slips away. Simondon (2009a: 8) argues that such events of disindividuation 
also furnish the possibility for new modalities of relation to others, determined not by logics of 
constituted identity or function which characterise what he terms ‘interindividual’ relations, 
but rather through a ‘transindividual’ relationality of uneffectuated preindividual potentials 
experienced only as affect. This experience of the transindividual emerges through a 
restructuring of the collective in response to the incompatibilities introduced by novel 
encounters, thus opening a thinking of the collective not as a pre-given totality or form as in 
traditional sociological accounts, but instead as a dynamic process of individuation emergent 
from the impersonal zone of metastable potential that constitutes the preindividual field 
(Combes, 2012: 52). Through the staging of affective encounters, Simondon argues that art can 
be understood to interrupt and suspend habitual, interindividual relations suppressing the 
effectuation of the preindividual, thereby providing conditions for individuations of the 
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collective that give rise to new transindividual forms of coupling between the inventive 
capacities of a plurality of (human, nonhuman, technical) individuals.  
 
The inventive limits and affective possibilities of emergent forms of transindividuality is 
arguably at the core of TC&A’s ongoing theoretical and artistic experiments with what they 
term the ‘Extended Body’ (Catts and Zurr, 2006: 2). Spotlighting the ‘semi-living object’ as 
one of its most evocative icons, the Extended Body is a conceptual device used by Catts and 
Zurr to engage critically and creatively with the potentials of contemporary biotechnologies to 
assemble disembodied fragments and elements of the human and nonhuman, the organic and 
inorganic, in technologically mediated and augmented forms of collective life. Unsettling the 
molar logics of identity and ‘interindividual’ relationality that underwrites posthuman 
imaginings of the ‘hybrid’ or ‘chimaera’ (Andrieu, 2007), the Extended Body instead emerges 
through transindividual relations of material exchange and affective resonance that constitute 
its incessant openness to modes of processual becoming. In this regard, I argue that what is 
particularly distinctive and affective about TC&A’s bioartistic practice then is their attempt to 
generate and perpetuate a more permeable sense of the human body in its material relations 
within biotechnical milieus of the semi-living through two main techniques. First, and 
performatively, TC&A’s installations frequently deploy various events and rituals to unsettle 
the spatial and temporal limits of the bioartwork. An especially affective example here is their 
meditation on the utopian promises and imaginaries of “victimless consumption” in the 
Disembodied Cuisine (2003; Nantes, France) installation, in which embodied subjects and 
bioartworks were quite literally connected in a ‘feasting ritual’ where semi-living frog steaks 
were cooked and eaten by volunteers in a nouvelle cuisine style dinner (Catts and Zurr, 2013: 
104-109). Therefore, and although one initially confronts the assemblage of perspex dishes, 
beakers, and fleshlike substances in microgravity bioreactors with clear borders, TC&A’s 
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performative rituals introduce a subsequent confusion about the precise spatial boundaries of 
the bioartwork, encouraging an affective sense of the body’s material and molecular 
implication within its ongoing and indeterminate individuations.  
 
Secondly then, and viscerally, TC&A’s bioart encounters are predicated on thinking and 
feeling the living body as a continuous topological folding of the material intensities and forces 
of the outside, and thus their installations seek to creatively experiment with the body’s 
capacity to transduce these divergent realities into new processes of collective individuation 
(Mackenzie, 2005). The transformative potential of encounters of human and nonhuman bodies 
is an explicit focus of TC&A’s most recent project, The Tissue Engineered Muscle Actuator 
(2012-present), which attempts to develop a ‘semi-living machine’ that technically organises 
and amplifies the physico-chemical contractions of muscle fibres grown in-vitro (Catts and 
Zurr, 2013: 111).The semi-living machine is in turn connected to speakers that transduce the 
mechanical energy of these contractions into low-frequency sounds, which vibrationally 
impact and modulate bodies in the gallery space through viscerally-felt affective intensities. 
Working through the transductive force of sonic affects then, the Muscle Actuator explores the 
potential for new transindividual events of affective exchange between the twitching 
contractions of semi-living materials, the vibrational pulses of electronic sound, and the 
convulsive tendencies of our own flesh and bone. Following Simondon (1992: 304), what 
experiential encounters with bioart foreground is an affective sense of the human body as 
always-already transindividual: as an ontogenetic event comprising more than one kind of life. 
Thinking the affective power of bioart encounters through Simondon’s transductive 
perspective thus entails a shift in our conceptions of a politics of (bio)technologies: from 
representational modes of prophylactic closure that would seek to defend the human subject’s 
essential unity from the contaminating threat of technology, to a more molecular politics of 
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creative micro-interventions that reconfigure and transform the material relations of forces and 
bodies in ways that open new potential forms of collective life. Or in other words, for new 
capacities of sensing the nonhuman materiality that we are affecting and being affected by the 
materiality that surrounds us. 
 
Disorienting Perception: The ‘Killing Ritual’ 
Individuation, for Simondon, is always a process of the in-between, serving to unsettle 
hylomorphic dualities that form the core of much post-Kantian philosophical and aesthetic 
thinking. Theorising perception, Simondon (2009a: 9) argues that this includes the Kantian 
duality between the material contents of experience out there in the world, and the a priori 
forms imposed by the intellect upon these otherwise chaotic contents. Whereas Kant remains 
tied to a hylomorphic dyad of form/content and a cognitivist understanding of the subject when 
explaining perception, Simondon (2005: 243) moves more decisively towards a theorisation of 
the genesis of perception in terms of a transductive process of individuation. Conceived as 
metastable individuations, he argues that both subject and object, and by extension then 
spectator and artwork, are envelopments of preindividual forces and singularities (Salter, 
2012). Perception here becomes reframed as the individuating operation that generates, through 
the problematic encounter of subject and world, an internal resonance; a certain modality of 
perceptual resolution. Following Simondon (2005), the genetic element for events of 
perception is therefore not our confrontation with the ready-made forms and objects of the 
world, but rather a disorienting encounter with ‘dynamic coefficients of intensity’ he terms 
‘information’ which force the subject to constantly reconfigure its relation to the world (p. 
242). The forms that come to occupy perceptual experience are thus reimagined as the vestiges 
of encounters with these intensive, preindividual forces of information. As Simondon writes: 
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‘Perception is not the grasping of a form, but the solution of a conflict, the discovery of 
a compatibility, the invention of a form. This form which constitutes perception not 
only modifies the relation of object and subject, but also the structure of the object and 
that of the subject’ (Simondon, 2005: 235) 
 
In other words, events of perception involve not only the dynamic emergence of perceptual 
forms, but also the invention of new transductive folds and vital liaisons of thought and world. 
Initiated by the disorienting incompatibilities of forces generated through material encounters, 
perception thus discovers modes of orientation, directing attention towards some things (not 
just physical objects, but also thoughts, feelings, judgements), whilst relegating others to the 
‘background’ of awareness (Simondon, 2005: 244). However, these modes of perceptual 
orientation are never static or self-contained. Instead, they are themselves metastable, 
composed as a wealth of preindividual forces and incipient forms that may, through the 
disorienting shock of a new encounter or interruption, be actualised as creative responses to 
novel incompatibilities of subject and world (Connolly, 2011).  
 
At stake in encounters with bioart, I argue, is a disorientation of perceptual and intensive 
registers that makes affectively felt this imperceptible background of perception and the “more-
than” of human subjectivity. Perhaps one of the more evocative means by which this is staged 
in the gallery installations of TC&A is through the tactile aesthetics of the Killing Ritual. At 
the end of every durational installation, TC&A face the ultimate challenge of an artistic 
endeavour – destroying their creations7. Devised as a provocation on the temporality of living 
art and the affective and emotional implications of biotechnological intervention in vital 
systems, the ritual is performed by switching off and removing the semi-living sculptures from 
their sterile containment in the bioreactor, and inviting the audience to touch them. As the 
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sculptures possess no immune system to defend them from contamination, their exposure to 
the bacteria in the air and on our hands proves fatal. The material encounters instigated through 
touch gives rise to modes of informational linkages between bodily membranes and world, 
transforming sense-perceptions of the sculptures from inert and contained coagulations of 
“fleshy matter” to dynamic forms of vibrant life with which our bodies co-inhabit a world of 
bio-chemical exchange, and whose problematic presencing demands from us an affective 
response. The irony, of course, is not lost on TC&A, who highlight how the killing ritual is no 
more violent to non-human forms of life than the act of brushing our teeth in the morning (Catts 
and Zurr, 2007). The ethical imperative of TC&A’s bioartistic practice thus lies less in a 
didacticism of moral responsibility that would demarcate in advance the acceptable remit of 
thought and action (what should we do?), than a creative experiment with the implications and 
possibilities of different affective relations, or new ethical modes of response-ability, to life’s 
dynamic and inventive process (what can we do?). Rather than ready-made solutions then, 
TC&A instead stage problematic shocks to thought and perception that encourage a more 
permeable and metastable sense of the human subject in its affective relations with the vital, 
material, and technical agencies constituting its intensive milieu of emergence.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 – Image from Pig-Wings – Killing Ritual, Biofeel exhibition, 2002. Medium: 
biodegradable polymer, bone cells, and glow-in-the-dark plastic coffin. ©Tissue Culture and 
Art Project (2002). Photo: Ionat Zurr] 
 
In her recent engagement with the thought of Simondon, Jane Bennett (2010: 56) takes aim at 
the modernist tendency of hylomorphically parsing reality into inert matter (it, things) and 
vibrant life (us, beings). Theorising a ‘vital materialism’ that takes seriously the intimate 
entanglements of human and nonhuman agencies in social and political life, Bennett (2010: 14) 
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contends that the ethico-political task becomes the staging of encounters that cultivate and 
amplify capacities to discern and respond to the nonhuman forces conditioning our ongoing 
dynamism, and thus our potential to think and be otherwise. By inviting audiences to see, eat, 
and touch the semi-living, I argue that encounters with bioart may be understood precisely as 
such ontogenetic events that invent new capacities for affecting and being affected by vital 
matters. The potential of the killing ritual in particular to perturb and disorient already-existing 
modes of perception is clear in the testimony of many participants who did not perceive the 
sculptures as ‘alive’ until they were finally killed: 
 
‘[the semi-living jacket in the Victimless Leather exhibition] started growing, growing, 
growing until it become too big. And [the artists] were back in Australia, so I had to 
make the decision to kill it. And you know what? I felt I could not make that decision. 
All of a sudden I’m here not sleeping at night about killing a coat. That thing was never 
alive before it was grown’8 
 
Conclusion 
How might we understand this feeling of ‘aliveness’, this disorienting sense of a problematic 
vitality, in encounters with bioart? In theorising the individuation of the living, Simondon 
(1992) is careful to distinguish himself from the hylomorphism of traditional vitalist 
philosophies that would posit life as a supervening force or spiritual substance adding a vital 
spark to the inertia of a passive matter. Instead, Simondon is interested in theorising the 
transductive connections that individuation generates between the living and nonliving, 
arguing that vital individuals remain indebted to the potentials and singularities of the prevital 
and preindividual, which they draw on and elaborate in the ongoing process of their creative 
becoming (Grosz, 2011: 38). Rather than a pre-given substance or essence then, Simondon 
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(1992: 305) forces us to think life as an ‘ontogenetic operation’: as a transductive movement 
and unfolding of potentials unknown in advance, with the living individual understood not only 
as a result but also, and more profoundly, ‘a theatre of perpetual individuation’ – a metastable 
event in its inventive process that always carries the potential for further individuations. Life, 
then, emerges and unfolds ‘in the interstices of the not-yet’, eluding the forms, practices and 
concepts that would seek to contain it (Hynes, 2007: 161).  Thinking life ontogenetically, I 
argue, thus shifts the terms of debate for theorising the political and ethical implications of 
contemporary biotechnological interventions; pushing beyond a (Foucauldian-biopolitical) 
focus on the discipline and regulation of already-constituted bodies and subjects, through an 
attentiveness to the immanent reconfigurations of the interstitial milieus and collective 
processes through which bodies come into being, as well as their material and affective 
capacities for becoming-other.  
 
One of the key implications of contemporary engagements with Simondon’s philosophy then 
is how it refocuses our attention as social scientists to those ‘streets, factories, and theatres’ 
(Hayward and Geoghegan, 2012: 8) where life, in all its multiple embodiments and biotechnical 
mediations, is being thought and articulated differently. In this regard, bioart can be 
productively considered within a broader field of aesthetico-political practices extending 
beyond the formal space of the gallery – including forms of tactical media, biohacking, and 
biodesign (Zylinska, 2009) – that creatively experiment with biotechnologies in ways that 
enliven and transform collective relations of thought, living bodies, and technical milieus. What 
an engagement with Simondon’s philosophy makes possible is a thought of how these creative 
practices and interventions serve to enhance bodily capacities for becoming sensitive to the 
material processes and relations that give birth to the status quo, as well as orienting thought 
and perception towards other potential individuations. In Simondon’s (2012) thought, art thus 
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presents a privileged “theatre of encounter” which extracts from the determinations of subjects 
and objects the possibilities for new material sensibilities and compositions of being. This 
ontogenetic potential of art is further echoed in the thought of Simondon’s most famous 
interlocutor, Deleuze, who writes that rather than simply representing or reflecting on life, art 
serves to generate sites of attachment and sensitivity to its force of creative difference and the 
metastability of its forms: 
 
‘Difference must be shown differing. We know modern art tends to realise these 
conditions: in this sense it becomes a veritable theatre of metamorphoses and 
permutations. A theatre where nothing is fixed’ (Deleuze, 2004a: 68) 
 
Rather than seeing TC&A’s artworks, and the domain of bioarts practice more generally, as an 
existential threat to the supposed propriety and essential unity of human life (Birke, 2006), we 
might instead theorise encounters with bioart as rendering explicit some of the ontogenetic 
consequences of new biotechnical mediations of living and nonliving milieus for how we think 
and respond to emergent forms of collective life. To encounter the “semi-living” then is 
precisely to encounter this metastability of life’s ontogenetic becoming, generating a 
disorienting and affective sense of ourselves as materially implicated in its indeterminate and 
excessive possibilities for future transformations.  
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Notes 
1 It should be noted here that ‘bioart’ represents a broad and contested term for a heterogeneous 
array of artistic practices that incorporate different expressive media, technological 
engagements, and philosophical orientations. Artistic practices involving, for example, tissue 
culture engineering (e.g. Tissue Culture and Art), genotype and phenotype reprogramming 
(Marta de Menezes), bio-robotics (Stelarc), and bodily self-experimentation/biohacking 
(ORLAN) have all come under the banner of “bioart” in recent years. For bioartist Eduardo 
Kac, it is the engagement with biotechnology at a “material level” that distinguishes bioart 
from practices which use traditional (painting/sculpture) or digital media to address 
biotechnological themes and concerns. Whilst recognising this heterogeneity, when using the 
term ‘bioart’ in this paper I am implicitly referring to the practices of the Tissue Culture and 
Art project to reflect my empirical focus.    
2  The commodification and consumption of the semi-living has thus been a recurring focus of 
TC&A’s work, ranging from their early mediations on exploitation and ‘victimless’ 
consumption in the Disembodied Cuisine [2000-2001] and Victimless Leather [2004] projects, 
to their more recent examinations of ‘revitalisation’ and nonhuman agency in The DIY De-
Victimizers [2006] and Tissue Engineered Muscle Actuators [2013-Present]. Further details on 
their ongoing practice can be found at: http://www.tca.uwa.edu.au/ and 
http://www.symbiotica.uwa.edu.au/ 
3 This tendency to read the different elements of Simondon’s thought in a self-contained way 
is something exacerbated by the rather unorthodox publication history both within his native 
France (in which the two parts of his principle thesis, L’Individuation á la lumière des notions 
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de forme et d’information, were published 25 years apart), as well as the paucity of translations 
of his works available in the English language (which at the time of writing include translated 
fragments in different journals, and one book: Simondon’s (2011b) introductory lectures on 
general psychology, translated as Two Lessons on Animal and Man). Sadly, Simondon’s own 
capacity to fully explore and elaborate the nature of the connections between his thinking on 
being and technology was cut short by his struggles with illness from the early 1970s until the 
year of his death in 1989 (Bardini, 2014: 4). 
4 When referencing MEOT in this paper I have made use of Ninian Mellamphy’s unpublished 
translation of the first part of the book (Simondon, 1980), as well as Ninian Mellamphy, Dan 
Mellamphy, and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy’s recent publication of the third part in Deleuze 
Studies (Simondon, 2011a). When engaging material from Simondon’s principal thesis, fully 
published in French as L’Individuation á la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d’Information 
(Simondon, 2005), I draw on the published translations of chapters in Parrhesia (Simondon, 
2009a) and the edited book ‘Incorporations’ (Simondon, 1992), as well as the unpublished 
translation of his chapter on perception by Taylor Adkins (available at 
http://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/). Where no English translations exist for certain texts 
– such as Imagination et Invention (Simondon, 2008) – I rely on translated quotes taken from 
other secondary literatures on Simondon. However, and when I do, I also provide the relevant 
page numbers from the corresponding texts by Simondon in French. 
5 The differences between Deleuze and Simondon’s theories of becoming is the focus of an 
article by Hansen (2001), whose concern lies with challenging Deleuze’s supposed 
misappropriation of Simondon’s philosophy. Hansen argues that Deleuze’s interpretation 
incorrectly makes of the preindividual a ‘transcendental condition’, affording it a separate 
ontological status, such that individuation becomes the ‘actualisation of a transcendental field’ 
rather than an ongoing, transductive mediation between two co-evolving terms as in 
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Simondon’s philosophy. However, I argue that Hansen’s thesis similarly relies on a misreading 
of Deleuze’s (2004b) own development of the concept of the ‘transcendental field’ and 
specifically the material and intensive processes that relate it to actuality. Moreover, it misses 
the ways in which Simondon’s theory of individuation as transductive mediation in fact 
explicitly informs Deleuze’s more processual thinking on the folds of the virtual and actual 
developed in his later writings on the concepts of ‘the membrane’ (Deleuze, 1999) and ‘the 
crystal-image’ (Deleuze, 2005). In contrast then, I argue that Deleuze’s engagement with 
Simondon in his texts of the 1960s, which as Sauvagnargues (2012: 20) writes should be 
understood in the context of his Nietzschean critique of (Hegelian) dialectical reason and the 
primacy of the negative, draws from Simondon’s philosophy an affirmative theory of 
difference (disparity) and the encounter that helps push his thought to its non-anthropological 
and ontogenetic limits.  
6 Rethought through the conceptual lens of modulation then, the clay brick’s individuation is 
conceived as the emergent effect of the coming-into-resonance of a plurality of material forces 
and tendencies: including, for example, the malleable potentials of the clay’s colloidal 
microstructures, the energy and pressure imparted by the labourer, and the physical force of 
the mould (Sauvagnargues, 2012: 3). 
7 As Catts and Zurr (2007: 239) state, transporting living materials across international borders 
is incredibly difficult, and because of the high costs and infrastructure required for ‘feeding’ 
the semi-living sculptures under sterile conditions there is usually no one willing or able to 
adopt them at the end of the installation.  
8 Comments made by Paola Antonelli, lead curator of the Victimless Leather exhibition at the 
New York Museum of Modern Art (2008). The original article is accessible at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/science/13coat.html?_r=0. 
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